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BRIEF OF APPELLEE BRUNO D'ASTON

JURISDICTION
The Order and Decree appealed from was entered March 9, 1990.
(R. 2325-30.)
26, 1990.

Eryck C. Aston filed his Notice of Appeal on March

(R. 2367-68.)

Appeal on April 5, 1990.

Bruno D'Aston filed a Notice of Cross
(R. 2388-89.)

Both the appeal and cross

appeal indicated that the appeals were taken to the Utah Supreme
Court, which had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)
(Supp. 1990) .1 The Supreme Court poured the case over to the Court
of Appeals in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp.
1990).

(R. 2436.)

This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990).

The underlying district court case is predominantly a
domestic relations case. The issues on appeal, however, relate
solely to a dispute between Bruno D'Aston and his son, Eryck C.
Aston, and are not in the nature of a domestic relations case.

SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS
Bruno D'Aston has filed herewith a Suggestion of Mootness
stating that the property which was the subject of this appeal has
now been distributed to the respective parties, and there is
nothing left upon which this court may act.

This appeal is moot.

Cinaolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Where a writ of execution is issued to enforce a decree

and property is seized under the writ, does the subsequent reversal
of the decree have any effect on the execution proceedings where
the reversal was on a collateral issue, and where the relief
obtained by execution was also sought under the complaint?
2.

If the trial court awards property based on a writ of

execution and the writ is voided by reversal of the underlying
decree, is the error harmless where the party was entitled to the
property in any event based on an agreement between the parties?
3.

Was any error in excluding a deposition for substantive

purposes, but allowing it for impeachment purposes, where the only
possible use for the deposition was impeachment?
4.

Should this Court review a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence where the appellant has not marshalled the evidence
in support of the findings?

2

5.

Is the testimony of the plaintiff on his own behalf

sufficient to support a finding in his favor notwithstanding the
existence of contrary evidence?
6.

Did the trial court err in including certain items of

property in the formal order although not specifically mentioned
in its memorandum decision, where the evidence supporting awarding
those items to plaintiff?
7.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to review an order

setting the amount of a supersedeas bond, where no notice of appeal
was filed subsequent to the entry of the order?
8.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in setting the

amount of a supersedeas bond at a level higher than advocated by
defendant, where the court had become familiar with the value of
the property during the course of the trial and the trial evidence
supported the amount of the bond?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ETC.
Bruno D'Aston is not aware of any constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation
is determinative of the issues presented by this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action to determine the

ownership and possessory rights in certain personal property which
was seized under authority of a Writ of Execution and Assistance
and thereafter held by the court.

3

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,

Plaintiff

("Husband" or "Bruno") filed his complaint for divorce against
defendant Dorothy P'Aston ("Wife") on May 2, 1986.

The complaint

also named the two adult children of the parties, Lisa Aston and
Eryck2 C. Aston

("Eryck"),

compelling

and

Wife

the

as defendants

children

to

and

return

sought
certain

property alleged to have been stolen from Husband.

an

order

personal

(R. 1-5.)

The

divorce case was tried before Judge Boyd L. Park on April 18-21,
1988.

(R. 307-32.)

The Decree of Divorce, which included an award

of personal property to Eryck Aston as well as to Husband and Wife,
was entered on December 15, 1988.

(R. 467-538.)

Wife appealed

from the Decree of Divorce, and the Decree was ultimately reversed.
Piston

v. P i s t o n ,

794 P.2d

500

(Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert.

denied, Case No. 900452 (Utah February 6, 1991).

See also P'Aston

v. P'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
On April 14, 1989, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution
and Assistance.

(R. 1707-08.)

The Writ was served on April 29,

1989, and numerous coins and other personal property were seized
and thereafter stored in a vault at Wells Fargo in Salt Lake City.
(Id.)

Served at the same time was an order prohibiting Eryck from

transferring or disposing of any of the personal property described
in the Pecree of Pivorce.

(R. 1737-38.)

2

The father and son disagree over the spelling of the son's
name. The father spells the name Erick; the son spells his name
Eryck. Several other versions of the son's name also exist. (Tr.
405-07.)
4

Bruno thereafter filed an Order seeking to have Eryck held in
contempt of court in accordance with the provisions of the Decree
of Divorce3 (R. 1742-43), and Eryck filed a motion to quash the
Writ of Execution and Assistance and to have the personal property
returned to him.

(R. 1753-55.)

Eryck also filed a motion seeking to have the Writ of Execution and Assistance declared invalid or to require Bruno to post
a bond.

(R. 2069-73.)

The motion was denied.

(R. 2103-04.)

On July 10, 1989, Eryck filed an affidavit asserting that the
trial judge, Boyd L. Park, was prejudiced against him.
24.)

(R. 2114-

Judge Park recused himself (R. 2128), and the case was

reassigned to Judge Ray M. Harding.

(R. 2129.)

The case was tried to Judge Harding on January 8, 9 and 22,
1990.

(R. 2209-14.)

The trial court entered its Memorandum

Decision on January 31, 1990, finding in favor of Bruno with
respect to a portion of the seized property.

(R. 2238-40.)

was awarded costs, and requested costs of $8,252.55.
44.) Eryck objected to the costs.

Bruno

(R. 2241-

(R. 2283-91.) Eryck also filed

a Motion to Amend Order or Judgment and for Turnover of Consigned
Property on February 20, 1990 (R. 2245-65), and objected to the
form of the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which
had been submitted by counsel for Bruno.

3

(R. 2266-82.)

Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce stated: "In the event
the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are found to
be in the possession of the defendants, Dorothy D'Aston and/or Eric
Aston, it should be considered as a contempt of court and punished
as such." (R. 471.)
5

By Memorandum Decision entered March 9, 1990, the trial court
disallowed the majority of the costs claimed by Bruno and denied
Eryck Aston's Motion to Amend Order or Judgment and for Turnover
of Consigned Property, and overruled Eryck7s objections to the
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 2314-15.)

On the same date, the court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 2316-24) , and its Order and Decree.

(R.

2325-30.)
Eryck moved for a stay pending appeal.

(R. 2335-61.)

The

trial court ultimately fixed a supersedeas bond at $150,000.00 by
order entered May 17, 1990. (R. 2418-19.)
Eryck filed his Notice of Appeal on March 26, 1990.
68.)

(R. 2367-

Bruno filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on April 5, 1990.

(R.

2388-89.)
On May 24, 1990, and based upon the representation of Eryck' s
counsel that he did not intend to file a supersedeas bond (R.
2429), Bruno moved for delivery of the coins awarded to him.
2423-24.)

(R.

Eryck opposed the motion (R. 2437A-39), and filed his

own motion seeking a more definite listing of the items awarded to
him.

(R. 2440-41.)

On July 9, 1990, the trial court entered its

Order to Deliver Personal Property, authorizing delivery of the
coins awarded to Bruno.

(R. 2522-26.)

The coins were apparently

withdrawn from court by Bruno soon thereafter.4
4

A copy of the Order to Deliver Personal Property showing
initials of Bruno D'Aston next to coins he received was filed with
the trial court on July 25, 1990. A copy of the Order, with the
initials, is attached to the memorandum supporting Bruno D'Aston's
Suggestion of Mootness filed herewith.
6

C.

Statement of Facts. The relevant facts are set forth in

the preceding procedural history.

Additional relevant facts are

set forth in connection with the Argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bruno D'Aston7s complaint alleged that Eryck Aston had stolen
coins and other personal property from plaintiff, and sought
appropriate relief. Bruno later was awarded that allegedly stolen
property in a divorce decree, and obtained a Writ of Execution and
Assistance to pick up the property if it was located.

Bruno

located the property in the possession of Eryck, and seized it.
The trial court ultimately awarded the property to Bruno.

The

divorce decree, which was the basis for the Writ of Execution and
Assistant, was later reversed. The reversal did not invalidate the
trial court's award, because the relief granted was requested in
the complaint and was not dependent on the writ of execution.

In

addition, Bruno would have been entitled to the property under the
directions given by the Court of Appeals in reversing the divorce
decree.
The trial court did not give improper preclusive effect to the
divorce decree, which was later reversed.

The portions of the

divorce proceedings and findings relied on by the trial court were
collateral to the decree, and not invalidated by the reversal. Any
error of the trial court was further harmless.
The evidence presented to the trial court was nearly all
contested.

Eryck Aston has challenged the sufficiency of the

7

evidence, but has failed to marshall the evidence supporting the
findings.

There is substantial evidence supporting the findings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

REVERSAL OP THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT BETWEEN
DOROTHY AND BRUNO DOES NOT AFFECT THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION THAT, AS BETWEEN BRUNO AND ERYCK,
THE COINS BELONGED TO BRUNO.
In June of 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals handed down a
narrowly worded reversal of Judge Boyd L. Park's distribution of
Bruno and Dorothy D'Aston's marital property and remanded the case
back for enforcement of the 1973 post-nuptial agreement.
v. D'Aston, 794 P.2d 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

D'Aston

Before this time,

on January 8, 1990, Judge Ray M. Harding held a trial to determine
whether certain coins and camera equipment

found

in Eryck,s

possession were the same coins and property Bruno had reported
stolen many years earlier. Judge Harding determined that (1) coins
matching the description of those stolen had been found in Eryck's
possession; (2) Eryck could not adequately explain why he had so
many coins identical to those missing; (3) Eryck had sold many of
the still missing coins to finance his recent expensive purchases;
(4) many of the coins matching the list of those stolen were taken
by Eryck himself.

The second trial was based upon the overturned

property agreement only insomuch that if the coins were found in
Eryck's possession were the ones taken from Bruno, then Bruno was
entitled to have them awarded to him.

Once awarded to Bruno, the

coins would still arguably be subject to division by Judge Park in
8

the remanded divorce proceeding between Bruno and Dorothy D'Aston.
At this second trial, Eryck's counsel stated that "the only issue
that is before the court with regard to these [coins and camera
equipment] is whose they are.

And what went on before is not

particularly germane to determining . . . who it [sic] belongs to."
(Tr. at 27.)
The reversal of the property settlement did not effect a
reversal of Judge Harding's determination that the coins found in
Eryck's store were the ones Bruno reported as stolen. As a matter
of law, a reversal by an appellate court extends only to those
issues which are before that court, which are decided in actuality
or by necessary implication. It does not affect collateral matters
not before the court.
This principle is illustrated by a case out of Montana.
v. Fix, 626 P.2d 1259 (Mont. 1981).
land.

Aye

Aye owned a lease on state

Aye orally agreed to assign the lease to Fix, but instead

gave Fix a sublease and an oral promise to give an assignment when
the current lease term expired on February 28, 1972.

About one

year before the lease term expired, however, Aye sold the lease to
Bruski and gave Fix a notice to quit.
Aye sued to evict.

Fix refused to leave, and

Fix counterclaimed asserting he was the owner

of the lands. The trial court ordered Fix to surrender possession
of the lands to Ayes, which Fix did on July 13, 1972.

The trial

court ultimately held for Fix (the defendant) , and awarded him
judgment for the loss of use of the lands.

Fix retook possession

and had use of the lands during the appeal.
9

In Aye v. Fix, 176

Mont. 474, 580 P.2d 97 (1978) (Aye I), the Montana Supreme Court
held the oral assignment to be unenforceable and ordered that the
"judgment in favor of Fix is reversed, and the cause is remanded
to the District Court with orders to enter judgment for plaintiffs
and to determine the damages due them."

580 P.2d at 100.

The second time around, the trial court awarded Bruski (who
stood in the plaintiff Aye's position) a $3,013.21 judgment for
loss of use during the appeal period, but denied Bruski's claim for
loss of use during 1971 (while the sublease to Fix was arguably
still in effect).

The trial court relied on its findings from the

first trial that Fix was rightfully

in possession under the

sublease from Aye. Bruski appealed, asserting that the trial court
could not rely on findings which had been reversed.

The Montana

Supreme Court disagreed, and held "a reversal extends only to those
issues which the appellate court decided

in actuality or by

necessary implication; it does not affect collateral matters not
before the court." Ave v. Fix. 192 Mont. 141, 626 P. 2d 1259, 1262
(1981) (citations omitted).
In the present case, the appellate

court's reversal of

property distribution and its remand for enforcement of the 1973
post-nuptial property agreement did not in any way affect Judge
Harding's determination that the coins found in Eryck's possession
were those stolen from Bruno.
The trial court's authority and jurisdiction to award the
personal property to Bruno rather than to Eryck was not dependant
on the writ of execution. Bruno's initial complaint in this action
10

stated claims against Eryck for return of the coins and other
personal property which Bruno alleged had been stolen from him.
Judge Harding 7 s Order and Decree was well within the scope of the
relief requested by the pleadings.

The reversal of the divorce

decree did not deprive Judge Harding of jurisdiction to afford
relief between Bruno and Eryck.
POINT II
JUDGE HARDING'S DETERMINATION THAT BRUNO WAS
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE COINS POUND IN ERYCK'S
POSSESSION WOULD REMAIN THE SAME UNDER THE
1973 POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT.
Under the Decree of Divorce on or about December 15, 1988,
Bruno was awarded coins and other various personal property which
Bruno alleged were removed from his car and his motor home on or
about April 30, 1986.

Included in this property was a number of

coins and other personal items including camera lenses, carrying
cases and other optical equipment.

Relying upon this property

distribution, Judge Harding, upon determination that the coins
found in Eryck's shop were those taken, awarded these coins to
Bruno.

The June 1990 reversal of the trial court's property

distribution would not affect Bruno's rights to these coins in any
way.

The relevant provisions of the 1973 agreement state:
2.
The wife transfers, bargains, conveys and quit claims to the husband all of her
right, title and interest in and to real
property located outside of the United States
of America and in and to all personal property
in the possession of the husband or subject to
his control in the United States, Europe or
elsewhere in the world . . . . The provisions
of this paragraph apply to all property described herein whether presently owned or in
11

existence or to be acquired or created in the
future.
3.
Hereafter and until this agreement
is modified in writing attached hereto, all
property real, personal and mixed acquired by
either party in his or her sole name from
whatever source derived and wherever situated,
shall be the sole and separate property of
such person notwithstanding any law, statute
or court decision giving presumptive effect to
the status of marriage; and such property
shall be free of all claims, demand [sic] or
liens of the other, direct or indirect, and
however derived.
The coins which were in the possession of Bruno prior to the
April 30, 1986, theft were Bruno's separate property under the
terms of this agreement.

The Court of Appeals directed that the

agreement be enforced according to its terms. The reversal of the
divorce decree therefore does not affect Bruno's claim to the coins
and other personal property.
POINT III
ERYCK ASTON WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY EXCLUSION
OF THE DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL GRAHAM.
In Point II of the first half of Eryck's brief (on pages 1013) , Eryck argues that he was prejudiced because Judge Harding
refused to let him relitigate issues which had been decided by
Judge Park. Eryck challenged Bruno's claim that certain coins had
been consigned to Bruno by Michael Graham, doing business as
,I

1841.M

Michael Graham testified by deposition that he had not

consigned coins to Bruno.

Eryck apparently asserts that he was

prejudiced by the exclusion of the Michael Graham deposition.

12

The difficulty with this argument is that the trial court did
not wholly exclude the deposition of Michael Graham. The court did
consider the deposition for impeachment of Bruno's testimony. The
entire deposition was submitted to the trial court. The transcript
does not show that any parts were excluded from the trial court's
review.

(Tr. 499-500.)

While it may appear at first glance that there was a limitation on the effect to be given the testimony, Eryck does not
explain what additional weight could have been given to the
deposition.

Mr. Graham was not a party, and could not have been

asserting any claim to the coins himself.

The lack of a consign-

ment would not have strengthened Eryck7s case, except insofar as
it weakened Bruno's credibility.

The only possible use of the

Graham deposition, therefore, would have been impeachment of
Bruno's testimony.

The trial court allowed that use.

Because Eryck has not shown that he was prejudiced by any
exclusion of evidence, the Order and Decree of the trial court must
be affirmed.

Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF COSTS WAS PROPER.

Eryck challenges the cost award to Bruno of $368.75 for
attorney fees incurred in connection with the deposition of Michael
Graham.

(Brief of Appellant Eryck C. Aston at p. 14.)

Eryck has

waived any objection to the award of costs, however, because he
voluntarily satisfied the judgment for costs.

(R. 2481-82.)

Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Construction Co. v. St. Joseph High
13

School Board of Financial Trustees, 794 P. 2d 505 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
The cost award was, in any event, proper. The deposition was
taken out of state on the eve of trial.

It was well within the

court's discretion to award Bruno his attorney fees incurred in
obtaining representation at the deposition out of state. See City
of Kingman v. Havatone, 14 Ariz. App. 585, 485 P.2d 574, 579
(1971).
POINT V
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.
Eryck argues in Point I of his Appendix (at pages 29-34) that
the

evidence

findings.

was

Eryck

insufficient

to

sustain

the

trial

supports his argument by arguing

court's
that the

applicable burden of proof is higher than in a criminal case, and
then setting forth only the evidence favorable to Eryck without
marshalling the evidence which supports the trial court's findings.
Eryck argues that Bruno was required to prove his title to the
coins with "reasonable certainty," and cites as support the case
of Burgess v. Small, 117 A.2d 344 (Me. 1955).

Eryck apparently

asserts that "reasonable certainty" is something greater than
preponderance of the evidence, and is fact greater than "beyond a
reasonable doubt."

(R. 2062.) The language of the Burgess opinion

clearly establishes that it is not:
The degree of particularity with which
identification must be made in proof of a
conversion in a trover action will vary with
the circumstances of the case.
Where, as
14

here, there is opportunity for commingling of
animals of the plaintiff with other animals of
like breed and answering the same general
description, identification must be made with
reasonable certainty. In Exchange State Bank
of Glendive v. Occident Elevator Co.. 95 Mont.
78, 24 P.2d 126, at page 129, 90 A.L.R. 740,
the Court said: "The rule as to circumstantial evidence in a civil case is that a party
will prevail if the preponderance of the
evidence is in his favor.
This court has
said: *The solution of any issue in a civil
case may rest entirely upon circumstantial
evidence. * * * All that is required is that
the evidence shall produce moral certainty in
an unprejudiced mind. * * * In other words,
when it furnishes support for the plaintiff's
theory of the case, and thus tends to exclude
any other theory, it is sufficient to sustain
a verdict or decision.'"

The theory adopted by plaintiff must emerge as
the most probable, and the evidence, if it is
to suffice, must tend to eliminate other
theories by force of the greater probability
and rational consistency of the plaintiff's
theory. This requirement is not met by wishful thinking or a likely guess.
117 A.2d at 345-46 (emphasis added).
The holding of Burgess, therefore, is that there must be some
substantial evidence to support the finding, not mere conjecture.
Accord Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986);
Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah
1978) . This holding is in accordance with Utah law in conversion
cases.

Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 2d 165, 514 P.2d 1284, 1286

(1973) . Bruno's evidence was not mere speculation, but meets the
reasonable certainty requirement.
Eryck challenges the evidence as insufficient, but has not
properly presented his challenge. When challenging a trial court's
15

findings, the appellant is required to marshall all the evidence
supporting the finding, and then show that the evidence is insufficient.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Rather than marshalling the evidence, Eryck presents only that
favorable to his point of view.

A few examples should be suffi-

cient (references are to the paragraphs of the Additional Statement
of Facts on pages 20-23 of Eryck's brief):
In paragraph 5 of his Statement of Facts, Eryck gives his
explanation of how he obtained the large inventory located in his
store in January and February, 1989.

Eryck fails to mention the

evidence that at the time of the divorce trial, April, 1988, the
value of his coin collection was only $5,000.00.

(Tr. 377, 517.)

Eryck's own witness acknowledged that Eryck would have needed to
have a lot of money to acquire his inventory.

(Tr. 479.)

Eryck

testified that the initial value of his inventory was $150,000.00
to $200,000.00.

(Tr. 409.)

Yet, in addition to having the money

to purchase that inventory, according to Eryck/s theory, he also
was able to give $110,000.00 to his sister (Tr. 444-45), and spent
approximately $70,000.00 on a second condominium.

(Tr. 409.)

These facts provide proper support for the trial court's finding
that the court "finds and reasonably infers that much of the
capital for co-defendant Eryck Aston7s recent purchases came from
the sale of plaintiff's coins, many of which are still missing."
(R. 2319 J 14.)
In paragraph 6 of the Statement of Facts, Eryck asserts that
he presented original invoices for many purchases.
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He fails to

disclose testimony that many of the invoices could not be matched
to the coins which were seized.

(Tr. 378, 412-15, 417.)

In paragraph 11 of his Statement of Facts, Eryck asserts that
Gary Fernandez, a dealer from California, testified to having seen
one of the coins bearing Bruno's stamped "A" as part of Barbara
Goldfried's collection.

Mr. Fernandez also testified, however,

that he had purchased certain "A" stamped coins from Bruno (Tr.
299-303), and that he had seen him at certain coin shows (Tr. 2993 00) .

Bruno testified that he had never parted with any marked

coins (Tr. 515) , and that he had never done business with Mr.
Fernandez and was not at a coin show where Mr. Fernandez claimed
to have met him.

(Id.)

In addition, there was evidence that at

least one of the coins identified by Fernandez as having Bruno's
stamp in fact had an imitated stamp.

(Tr. 516.)

In paragraph 12 of his Statement of Facts, Eryck asserts that
Bruno's statement that "apart from the A, could be mine could be
not," applies to "the coins which were before the court." A review
of the cited page of the transcript reveals that the statement
applies only to certain peace dollars, and that part of the set of
peace dollars in fact did have the "A" stamp.

(Tr. 217. See also

Tr. 262-63.)
In paragraph 14(a) of his Statement of Facts, Eryck asserts
that Bruno testified that certain coins were not identifiable.
Eryck omits the evidence that the numbers of the particular types
of coin recovered matched almost exactly the numbers which Bruno
claims were stolen.

(Tr. 205.)
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In paragraph 14(c) of his Statement of Facts, Eryck again
asserts that Bruno testified he had no way to identify the coins
listed on page 8 of Exhibit 8.

Eryck fails to mention that Bruno

did identify many of the coins of that group.

(Tr. 211-12.)

More examples could be given, but Bruno should not be required
to go to the effort of marshalling the evidence to support the
findings, where the case law clearly places the burden to do so on
Eryck.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., supra.

It may be true, as claimed by

Eryck, that the primary support for Bruno's case was his own
testimony.

It was well within the court's discretion, nonethe-

less, to accept the testimony of Bruno on those issues and reject
the evidence offered by Eryck. Guinand v. Walton, 25 Utah 2d 253,
480 P.2d 137, 139 (1971).

See also Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d

598, 603 (Utah 1983).
POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN INCLUDING
CERTAIN ITEMS OF PROPERTY IN THE DECREE
AND POST-TRIAL ORDERS.
Eryck asserts that the Order and Decree entered by the trial
court improperly included certain coins not specifically listed on
the trial court's Memorandum Decision.

A review of each claim

demonstrates that it is without merit:
A.

18.5 Gram Gold Nugget.

On the very bottom of page 1 of

the list of coins attached to the police report, Bruno listed an
84.5 gram Alaska gold nugget.

Bruno testified that the 84.5 gram

designation was an error, because an 84.5 gram nugget could not be
found outside of a museum, and that the 18.5 gram nugget was in
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fact his.

(Tr. 202-03.)

The trial court's finding on this issue

is supported by the evidence.
B.
Dollars.

84 Common Date BU-Dollars and 60 Common Date CIRCThe police report, page 2, shows a total of 520 Common

Date BU-Dollars and 440 Common Date CIRC-Dollars were stolen from
Bruno. It was within the court's discretion to include these coins
on the list to be awarded to Bruno.
C.

The 1914-S $20 U.S. Gold Piece.

This coin is listed on

the bottom of page 1 of the list of coins attached to the police
report.
D.

Consigned Coins. The justification for the inclusion of

the consigned coins is presented above.
E.

1904-S U.S. $20 Gold Coin. This coin was marked with an

"A" (Tr. 98-99), and Bruno testified that all of the "A" coins were
his.

(Tr. 64, 66-67.)
Eryck further argues that the trial court somehow erred in

allowing an Order to Deliver Personal Property (R. 2522-26) to be
signed by signature stamp.

(Appellant's brief at p. 41.)

Eryck

does not describe any specific error in the Order to Deliver.

In

any event, the signing of the order occurred on July 9, 1990, long
after Eryck's notice of appeal.

This Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider any errors relating to the Order to Deliver Personal
Property.
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POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ITS RULINGS REGARDING BONDS.
Eryck challenges the trial court's failure to require the
posting of a bond as a condition for holding the seized coins prior
to trial.

Eryck does not, however, state what relief he seeks by

reason of the claimed impropriety.

Any error in the issuance of

the Writ of Execution and Assistance is harmless, because many of
the seized coins and property were awarded to Bruno. Furthermore,
the issue is moot because Eryck seeks no relief by reason of the
claimed violation.
Eryck also challenges the trial court's order requiring Eryck
to post a supersedeas bond in the sum of $150,000.00 to obtain a
stay pending appeal.

The initial problem with this claim is that

the challenged order was entered May 17, 1990, nearly two months
after Eryck's notice of appeal.

Eryck did not file a separate

notice of appeal with respect to the supersedeas bond. This Court
lacks jurisdiction to review the propriety of the bond.
The amount of the bond is, in any event, within the trial
court's discretion, and no abuse of discretion appears.

Eryck

supports his argument by asserting that the only evidence of value
before the court was his own affidavit. Eryck fails to acknowledge
that there had been extensive and widely varying evidence concerning value presented at the trial.
472.)

(E.g., Tr. 155, 190, 409, 461,

In addition, many invoices showing the claimed initial

purchase price of the coins were submitted at trial.

The trial

court had adequate support for its statement that it was familiar
20

with the value of the coins.

It cannot be said that the trial

court abused its discretion in fixing the bond at $150,000.00.
CONCLUSION
All of Eryck's claims are moot, because the coins and other
personal property which were the subject of this action have been
delivered to the parties, and this court's ruling can have no
effect.

Even if this case is not moot, the decision of the trial

court should be affirmed.
hotly contested.

The evidence presented to the court was

There was evidence supporting the trial court's

findings, and those findings must be affirmed.
Eryck Aston's appeal should be dismissed, or alternatively,
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
DATED this 28th day of February, 1991.

S. REX LEWIS,
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellee
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Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
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APPENDIX "A"
Memorandum Decision
January 31, 1990

3f
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
**********

BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiffs,
-vsDOROTHY D'ASTON, et al.,
Defendants,

Case Number

CV86 1124

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
**********

The Court, having conducted a bench trial to
determine ownership of certain personal property as between
plaintiff Bruno D'Aston and defendant Eryck Aston, finds that
plaintiff is entitled to certain items of that property as
listed below. The Court feels it has made a fair
determination in this matter despite the lack of truthfulness
which was apparent in the testimony of both parties. At the
time of trial the parties agreed, and stipulated as to the
ownership of some coins and optical and camera equipment.
That stipulation is acceptable to the Court. At the time of
trial the Court made oral rulings concerning the real property
issues in the case. Those rulings are to be made a part of
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment which
will need to be prepared as a result of this hearing.
The Court finds that plaintiff has met his burden
of proving ownership to many of the items tendered as
evidence. When plaintiff's property disappeared he was able
to make a detailed list of many of the missing items from
memory. Some of those items while not exceptionally rare
would not be expected to turn up in an average coin shop.
While the Court realizes that most coins are not unique, many
coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, even those which
were
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unusual, unexplainedly appeared in defendant's coin shop.
Several of the coins reported missing by plaintiff were
stamped with an "A". Identical coins bearing an "A" were
found among the coins in defendant's inventory. Defendant,
though given the opportunity, did not adquately explain why he
had so many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, nor
did he plausably explain where he came up with sufficient
funds to purchase the inventory for his coin shop, or the
automobiles and property he has recently acquired. The Court
can reasonably infer that much of the the capital for
defendant's recent purchases came from the sale of plaintiff's
coins, many of which are still missing. The Court can also
infer that defendant had several coins identical to
plaintiff's missing coins because those coins were taken by
defendant.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court
finds that plaintiff is the owner of all of the coins now held
by the Court which bear an "A" stamp. Plaintiff is also the
owner of the items held by the Court which match those items
listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was
given to the police. Plaintiff's later inventories do not
appear to have the same reliability as the original report.
The Court further finds that plaintiff should receive any
items held by the Court which match the list of consignment
items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree as listed
on exhibit 24 from the divorce trial conducted by Judge Park.
The Court will assume that the bullion which was part of
exhibit 7 is a part of the bullion described in exhibit 57.
All of these items are ordered returned to plaintiff.
Defendant is awarded any items not included in the
above listing, and any furniture which is now in his
possession at his store.
Plaintiff is awarded costs.
2

Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a judgment consistent with the terms
of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to submission to the court for
signature.
Dated this 31st day of Januaj?^, A990^
THEVCOl

cc:

S. Rex Lewis, Esq.
Keith W. Meade, Esq.
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APPENDIX "B"
Memorandum Decision
March 9, 1990

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court «
CARMA B. SMITH1, Cferk

Deputy
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
**********

BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiffs,
-vsDOROTHY D'ASTON, et al.,
Defendants.

Case Number

CV86 1124

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

MEMORANDUM DECISION
**********

The Court, having considered defendant Eryck Aston's
objection to costs and disbursments, objection to proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and his motion to
amend order or judgment and for turnover of consigned
property, will rule on those matters.
Defendant's objections to the proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the whole appear to be an
attempt to relitigate the case. At the time the memorandum
decision was drafted, the Court was aware of the receipts
Eryck Aston produced as a part of his claim of ownership of
the coins. The evidence was given the weight the Court felt
it deserved. The most reliable document regarding ownership
of the coins was Bruno D'Aston's first list which he gave to
the police.
Defendant has also objected to findings regarding his
failure to produce competent evidence regarding the source of
funds for a number of his recent purchases. Plaintiff Bruno
D'Aston raised the issue, and Defendant Eryck Aston had the
opportunity to rebut or explain the items raised by
plaintiff. The Court is entitled to draw reasonable
inferrences from defendant's silence.

Defendant's objections to the findings and
conclusions are overruled.
After consideration of defendant's motion to amend
order or judgment, and for turnover of consigned property, the
Court will deny that motion. In the prior action, Bruno
D'Aston was awarded the consigned coins, and any obligations
accruing because of those consignments. Ownership of those
consigned items and any obligations that go with them is not
the subject of this action.
The Court has reviewed plaintiff's memorandum of
costs and disbursements, and the memoranda objecting to and
defending those costs. The costs and disbursments all appear
to be reasonable and necessary except the $3,068.75 fee for
execution by the constable, the storage fee and the locksmith
fee. Sections 21-3-3, and 21-2-4 U.C.A. limit the constables
fee for levying an execution to $15.00, and the storage fee to
$5.00 per day. The maximum allowable storage fee is
$1,270.00. The Court will therefore change those numbers by
interlineation. The Court finds that the locksmith's fee was
neither reasonable or necessary. The execution could have
been done during business hours when no locksmith was
necessary. That fee will therefore be excluded by the Court.
With those changes the documents submitted by plaintiff will
be executed by the Court.
Dated this 9th day of March, 1990.

cc:

S. Rex Lewis, Esq.
Keith W. Meade, Esq.
Ronald R. Stanger, Esq.
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APPENDIX "C"
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County, State ot Utah.
SMITH, Clerk

Deputy

S. REX LEWIS (1953) and
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (3872), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

K:Astn-fof.lo
Our File No. 17,603

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.
LISA ASTON and ERIC
ASTON,

Civil No. CV 86 1124
Judge Ray M. Harding

Co-defendants.

Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and plaintiff's
Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel,

"3LG

Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises,
and good cause appearing therefor, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court herein entered a Decree of Divorce on or about December 15, 1988,

whereby it awarded various personal property to the plaintiff, including various items which
plaintiff alleges were removed from his car and his motor home on or prior to April 30, 1986.
2.

The divorce decree also awarded to plaintiff a one-half interest in various

personal property located at the marital home of 1171 No. Oakmont, Provo, Utah ("marital
home").
3.

The Decree of Divorce awarded the marital home to defendant Dorothy

D'Aston.
4.

The Decree of Divorce also awarded to the plaintiff other personal items,

including cameras, lenses, carrying cases, and other optical equipment.
5.

Prior to the separation of plaintiff and defendant Dorothy D'Aston, plaintiff

was involved for numerous years in the buying, selling, and collecting of coins, rare coins, and
other similar items.
6.

On many of plaintiff's rare coins, he stamped the rim above the head with

the letter "A."
7.

Shortly after the plaintiff's personal property disappeared in April, 1986,

plaintiff was able to make a detailed list for the police department from his memory of many
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of the missing items. Some of those items, while not exceptionally rare, would not be expected
to appear in an average coin shop.
8.

On March 15, 1989, Eric Aston made and executed a Bill of Sale to Lloyd Ross

Engle and Jan Chapman Engle to various items of personal property located in the marital
home. Eric Aston assisted in the sale of the real property and accepted a quit claim deed
from defendant Dorothy D'Aston aka Dorothy Aston on March 14, 1989. On the same date,
Eric Aston executed a warranty deed to the Engles for the sale of the marital home. At the
closing of the sale of the property on March 14, 1989, Eric Aston received two trust account
checks from Provo Land Title Company, one for the sum of $58,144.44, and one for the sum
of $58,144.48, for a total cash receipt of $116,288.92.
9.

On April 14, 1989, this Court issued its Writ of Execution and Assistance.

Pursuant to that Writ, John Sindt, a constable of Salt Lake County, took various items into his
possession on April 29, 1989, from co-defendant Eric Aston.
10.

The various property identified as Exhibit 7 at the hearing hereof obtained

by Constable Sindt, was previously located at co-defendant Eric Aston's business known as The
Gold Connection at approximately 21st South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
11.

Many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, even those which were

unusual, unexplainably appeared in Eric Aston's coin shop. Several of the coins reported
missing by plaintiff were stamped with an "A." Identical coins bearing an "A" were found
among the coins in co-defendant Eric Aston's inventory.
12.

Though given an opportunity, co-defendant Eric Aston has not adequately

explained why he had so many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins.
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13.

Within the past several months, co-defendant Eric Aston has made significant

purchases, including inventory for his coin shop, several automobiles, and two separate
condominiums. Co-defendant Eric Aston has not plausibly explained the manner and source
of the funds sufficient to purchase the inventory for his coin shop, the automobiles, and
property he has recently acquired.
14.

The Court finds and reasonably infers that much of the capital for co-

defendant Eric Aston's recent purchases came from the sale of plaintiff's coins, many of which
are still missing.
15.

The Court also finds and reasonably infers that co-defendant Eric Aston had

several coins in his possession identical to plaintiff's missing coins because those coins were
actually taken by co-defendant Eric Aston.
16.

The parties have stipulated that co-defendant Eric Aston claims no interest

in the cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment found in co-defendant Eric Aston's store,
and that the Court can enter an order awarding the same to plaintiff, which items were
received by plaintiff at the time of the hearing herein.
17.

The parties have also stipulated that plaintiff makes no claim to various

dimes, pennies, nickels, quarters, one-half dollars, dollars, and panda bullion which can be
awarded to co-defendant Eric Aston and were received by him at the time of the hearing
herein.
18.

Plaintiff has met his burden of proving ownership to many of the items

entered as evidence herein.

Plaintiff is the owner of all coins which bear an "A" stamp,

including all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp. A list of the "A"
stamped coins held by the Court is as follows:
4

Morgan Silver Dollar
Carson City Silver Dollar
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty

1892 P
1890
1879
1871 S
1914 S
1881 0
1890 CC
1922 D
1923 S
1924 S
1934 D
1896 S
1904 S
19.

Plaintiff is also the owner of the items held by the Court which match those

items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to the police. These
items on plaintiff's first list of stolen property are as follows:
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins).
U. S. Gold Dollars
1
2

1849 - AU
1853 - AU

S2 112 U. S. Gold
1
1
1

1905 - UNC
1915 - AU
1911 - D

S10 U. S. Gold
1
1

1910 - D - UNC
1915 - UNC

$20 U. S. Gold
1
1

1871 - AU
1897 - BU
5

1
1
1

1914 - S - BU
1925 - BU
18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget

2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars)
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985)
Canada Dollars
13
20
45
120
137
60
1
120
6
470

1958
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1967
1967
1984

- BU
- BU
- BU
- BU
- Type 1, BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU
- LB - BU
- D.G. 45° - BU
- BU
- Canada proof sets with $20 Gold
- proof dollars and case

U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars
1

1879 - Metric proof

5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883;
1-1884; and 1-1890.
84
60

Common dates BU - dollars
Common dates CIRC - dollars

Miscellaneous Gold
6
1
3
3
2

1-oz. - K - Krugeran.
1-oz. - M - Mapleleaf.
Mex - 2 Peso
Mex - 2 1/2 Peso
Mex - 1947 - 50 Peso - BU

Stamps - one book.

6

20.

Plaintiff's later inventories do not appear to have the same reliability as the

original list of stolen property.
21.

Plaintiff is the owner and should receive any items held by the Court which

match the list of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on
Exhibit 24 thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. The
bullion which was a part of Exhibit 7 is also a part of the bullion described in Exhibit 57 at
the trial and all of these items are to be returned to plaintiff.
22.

Co-defendant Eric Aston is the owner of the items not included in the above

listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store.
23.

Plaintiff has incurred costs of court and is entitled to be awarded them from

the co-defendant Eric Aston.
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this

2.

The Court should approve the stipulations of the parties made at the hearing

action.

regarding ownership of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various
coins to the co-defendant Eric Aston.
3.

Plaintiff should be awarded all coins which bear an "A" stamp, including all

of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and all items held by the Court
which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to
the police.
7

4.

Plaintiff should also receive any items held by the Court which match the list

of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on Exhibit 24
thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57.
5.

Plaintiff should be awarded all of the bullion which was a part of Exhibit

7 herein, and which was described in Exhibit 57 herein.
6.

All of the above-described items should be ordered returned to the plaintiff.

7.

Co-defendant Eric Aston should be awarded any items not included in the

above listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at the store.
8.

Plaintiff should be awarded costs of court.

9.

Co-defendant Eric Aston should not be held in contempt for his actions in

assisting in the sale of the marital home and executing the bill of sale on the various personal
property contained therein.
DATED this y

day of February 1990.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ.
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston
8

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was faxed to the
following, this

/(

day of February, 1990.

Keith W. Meade, Esq.
525 East 100 South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

SECRETARY

(«0
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APPENDIX "D"
Order and Decree

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County, State of Utah
CARMA B. SMITH/Clerk

Sg^

Deputy

S. REX LEWIS (1953), for:
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Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND DECREE
vs.

DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.
LISA ASTON and ERIC
ASTON,

Civil No. CV 86 1124
Judge Ray M. Harding

Co-defendants.

Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and plaintiff's
Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel,
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Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises,
good cause appearing therefor, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following:
ORDER AND DECREE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The stipulations of the parties made at the hearing herein regarding ownership

of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various coins to co-defendant
Eric Aston is hereby approved with each party awarded ownership of those items.
2.

Plaintiff is the owner of all of the coins which bear an "A" stamp, including

all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and is the owner of the items
held by the Court which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property
which was given to the police, more particularly described as follows:
"A" Stamped Coins:
1892 P
1890
1879
1871 S
1914 S
1881
1890
1922
1923
1924
1934
1896
1904

O
CC
D
S
S
D
S
S

Morgan Silver Dollar
Carson City Silver Dollar
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty

2

Plaintiff's First List of Stolen Property:
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins).
U. S. Gold Dollars
1
2

1849 - AU
1853 - AU

$2 1II U. S. Gold
1
1
1

1905 - UNC
1915 - AU
1911 - D

$10 U. S. Gold
1
1

1910 - D - UNC
1915 - UNC

S20 U. S. Gold
1
1
1
1
1

1871 - AU
1897 - BU
1914 - S - BU
1925 - BU
18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget

2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars)
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985)
Canada Dollars
13
20
45
120
137
60
1
120

1958
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1967

-

BU
BU
BU
BU
Type 1 BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU.
LB - BU
D.G. 45° - BU
BU
3

6
470

1967 - Canada proof sets with $20 Gold
1984 - proof dollars and case

U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars
1

1879 - Metric proof

5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883;
1-1884; and 1-1890.
84
60

Common dates BU - dollars
Common dates CIRC - dollars

Miscellaneous Gold
6
1
3
3
2

1-oz. - K - Krugeran.
1-oz. - M - Mapleleaf.
Mex - 2 Peso
Mex - 2 1/2 Peso
Mex - 1947 - 50 Peso - BU

Stamps - one book.
3.

Plaintiff should receive delivery and possession of all items held by the Court

which match the list of consignment items awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed
on Exhibit 24 thereof, and which are a part of Exhibit 7 herein and also described in Exhibit
57 herein. These consignment items are included in the items described in paragraph 2 above.
4.

as described in Exhibit 57 herein.
5.

or

Plaintiff is the owner of all the bullion which was part of Exhibit 7 herein

Plaintiff is hereby awarded court costs in the amount of S fo?9.7£

4
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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that codefendant Eric Aston is awarded the items retained by the Court not included in the above
listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store.
DATED this /

day nCTi In innr- 1990.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ.
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston

5

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

*/^

day of February, 1990.

Keith Meade
525 East 100 South
5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
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SECRET AI
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